SHAMIELAH HENDRICKS AND 4 OTHERS V ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NAMIBIA
AND TWO OTHERS
CASE NO. (P) A 140/2000
2002/08/20
Teek, JP et Maritz, J
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
COMBATTING OF IMMORAL PRACTICES ACT, 1980
Constitutional
vagueness and overbreadth – meaning of “prostitution” and
“lewd or immoral purpose” – words not terms of art –
commonly used and frequently applied – definition of – not
impermissibly vague.
Article
21(1)(j) of Constitution – protection of economic freedom –
historical background of job reservation and discrimination –
intended to guarantee freedom to choose and pursue profession,
occupation, trade or business – choice limited to menu of lawful
options – keeping of brothel for purposes of prostitution not a
lawful option – proscription in s. 2(1) of the Act not
derogating from that freedom – in any event, even if protected,
derogation justified under article 21(2) in interest of public
order, decency or morality – social ills associated with
prostitution discussed.
Overbreadth
and unreasonable restriction – definition of brothel including
“place to visit for the purpose of ‘unlawful carnal
intercourse’” – such intercourse defined as intercourse
between persons not married to one another or living in customary
union – differences between such intercourse and intercourse in
course of prostitution discussed – former not raising the same
moral, social, health and public concerns – inclusion of those
words in definition of “brothel” falling outside the sweep of
allowable area of State control – falls foul of minimum
impairment rule and thus unreasonable
Overbreadth
and unreasonable restriction – definition of brothel including
“place to visit for other lewd or immoral purpose” –
including activities that are otherwise perfectly lawful – not
qualified to limit application to sexual interaction between
persons – unreasonable restriction.
Article
25 (1)(b) of the Constitution - questions of constitutionality -
Court will consider admissions, uncontested allegations and
submissions relating thereto – not bound by concessions –
constitutionality a question of law – Court charged by
Constitution only to make declarator if it is of the opinion law
is unconstitutional.
Article
25 (1) of the Constitution - serverance – Court not to make
order of unconstitutionality wider than necessary - test for
severance discussed – if “bad” part is severed, remainder
linguistically sustainable, conceptually intact and functionally
operational
Article
25(2) of Constitution - locus standi to challenge
constitutionality of law – distinguished from requirements for
common law standing – applicant bears onus to establish –
applicants neither “aggrieved persons” nor claiming that a
fundamental right has been “infringed or threatened” i.r.o
their challenge to ss. 2(2), 10(b) and 12(3) of the Act – no
standing to attack those sections.
Article
12(1)(d) of the Constitution – presumption of innocence –
reverse onus provisions contained in ss. 2(3) and 12(1) and
(2) of the Act – those provisions imposing full legal burden on
the accused - rational connection test applied – provisions not
passing muster - unconstitutional.
Article
12(1)(d) of the Constitution – rational connection test –
adoption of the test by this Court suspect – not mindful of
differences between our and other Constitutions – our
Constitution not allowing in express terms derogation from
entrenched right – presumption of innocence not qualified –
quaere: should this Court not revisit the criteria adopted
in earlier judgments allowing for reverse onus provisions?
Section
2(1) of the Act – keeping of brothel for the purpose of
prostitution not unconstitutional – keeping of brothel for
persons “to visit for purposes of unlawful carnal intercourse or
for any other lewd or immoral purpose” severed and declared
unconstitutional – latter struck from the definition.
Section
10(a) of the Act – “person knowingly (living) on earnings of
prostitution” – not criminalizing prostitution –
prostitution per se not a crime – section referring to
pimps and others in a parasitic relationship with prostitute –
not including those (s)he is under duty to maintain or those
rendering services or supplying goods not associated with the
promotion or management of her profession – not overly broad and
unconstitutional.
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CASE NO. (P) A140/2000
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NAMIBIA
In the matter between:
SHAMIELAH HENDRICKS
WILHELMINA ELIZABETH ROBERTSON
CHARMAINE DU PLOOY
THEODORA BEKOVA
DIMITAR DIMOV KOUZIDIMOV
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First Applicant
Second Applicant
Third Applicant
Fourth Applicant
Fifth Applicant
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versus
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ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NAMIBIA
PROSECUTOR- GENERAL OF NAMIBIA
MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS
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First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
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CORAM: TEEK, J.P. et MARITZ, J.
Heard on: 2000/05/15
Delivered on: 2002/08/20
JUDGMENT
MARITZ, J.: Faced with charges that they have
contravened sections 2(1) and 10(a) of the Combating of the Immoral
Practices Act, 1980 (the “Act”), the applicants are seeking an
order declaring sections 1(i), 2, 10 and 12 of the Act to be
unconstitutional and of no force and effect. They are also seeking to
interdict the second respondent from proceeding with the prosecution
on those charges against them; an order compelling the third
respondent to return to them all articles and monies seized from them
on 16 November 1999 and costs of suit in the event of the application
being opposed. In the interim they sought and obtained an
order for the temporary stay of their prosecution in the Magistrate’s
Court pending the final determination of this application.
The grounds on which the applicants are attacking the
constitutionality of the sections are wide-ranging: the sections
conflict with or derogate from the applicants’ fundamental right to
equality (Article 10); to presumed innocent (Article 12(1)(d);
against self-incrimination (Article 12 (1)(f)); to privacy (Article
13); to freedom of association (Article 21(1)(e)) and to the freedom
to practise any occupation, trade or business (Article 21(1)(j));
that the definition of “brothel” (read with the definition of
“unlawful carnal intercourse” is overbroad and so too, is section
2(2) of the Act.
The respondents opposed the application in form but not in substance:
they jointly filed a notice of opposition but, in his answering
affidavit (echoed by the second and third respondents), the Attorney
General states his stand on the issue as follows:
“3. I wish to state unequivocally that I support the policy
rationale underlying the Combating of Immoral Practices Act insofar
as it criminalises the maintenance of houses of prostitution and the
promotion of, and profiting from organised prostitution.
4. I sincerely believe that the afore-mentioned evils are
unacceptable to the vast majority of the Namibian public and offend
community standards of morality. For this reason, appropriate
criminal laws are needed in this area.
5. I note that the Combating of Immoral Practices Act was enacted
before Independence and in the absence of a supreme Constitution or a
bill of rights. Having studied the statute, I have serious
reservations as to whether certain sections of the statute will
withstand constitutional scrutiny today. The Government of the
Republic of Namibia stands ready to be guided by the Honourable Court
as to the constitutionality of the sections challenged herein.”
It is indeed so that the Act was adopted by the National Assembly of
South West Africa under a positivistic dispensation where the
exercise of its legislative discretion was not in any way fettered by
the obligation to enact laws that do not conflict with or derogate
from a body of entrenched fundamental rights. Whilst bearing this and
the historical legislative disregard for certain basic fundamental
rights under South African rule in mind but, at the same time,
recognising the need to ensure a smooth transition to Independence,
the Constituent Assembly adopted the body of South African laws
applicable in South West Africa immediately before Independence as
the laws of the new Namibian State. It did so, however, subject to
the provisions of the Constitution and only until those laws are
“repealed or amended by Act of Parliament or until they are
declared unconstitutional by a competent Court” (Article 140(1) of
the Constitution). This Court is expressly charged in Article 80(2)
with the adjudication of cases “which involve the interpretation,
implementation and upholding of (the) Constitution and the
fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed thereunder” and, in
relation to pre-independence laws that do not meet the muster of the
values articulated in the Constitution, to set them aside or to allow
Parliament to correct any defect therein (Article 25(1)(b)). It is
with this measure in mind that I shall first consider the
constitutionality of the sections under which the applicants are
charged (sections 2(1) and 10(a)), then the sections that do not form
the subject matter of a charge (sections 2(2) and 10(b)) and finally,
the presumptions (sections 2(3) and 12).
Sections
2(1) and 10(a) of the Act
Section 2(1) makes it an offence for
any person to keep a brothel. In addition to its ordinary grammatical
meaning, “brothel” by definition in section 1(i), “includes any
house or place kept or used for purposes of prostitution or for
persons to visit for the purpose of having unlawful carnal
intercourse or for any other lewd or immoral purpose.” The Act also
defines the word “house” to include “a dwelling-house, flat,
building, room, out-house, shed or tent or any part thereof” and
“place” to include “any premises, field, enclosure, space,
vehicle or boat or any part thereof”.
The extended definition in section
1(i) contemplates three activities, the commission of any of which
will characterise a house or place as a “brothel”: keeping or
using it (a) for purposes of prostitution; (b) for persons to visit
for the purpose of having unlawful carnal intercourse and (c) for
persons to visit for any other lewd or immoral purpose. Those
activities differ significantly from one another in substance and,
for reasons of convenience, fall to be considered separately for
purposes of the constitutional challenge. I shall do so in that
order.
“… for purposes of
prostitution”
This activity falls squarely within
the ordinary and accepted meaning to the term “brothel” (see: R
v De Bruyn and Another, 1957 (4) SA 408 (C) at 411A-B). The words
“prostitution” and “prostitute” are not terms of art. They
are commonly used and have frequently been considered and applied by
this and other Courts in the past. In R v Moonsamy, 1918 TPD
79 the Court had to decide whether the evidence established that the
appellant was a prostitute. De Villiers JP, who delivered the Court’s
judgment, said at 80:
“We must take the word ‘prostitute’ in its ordinary sense –
namely, a woman who is earning a living by means of prostituting her
body.”
(cf. R v Wainer, 1917 OPD 65 op
66). In R v Kam Cham, 1921 EDL 326 at 329 Graham JP, following
Moonsamy’s case, held that the evidence in that case “was
not sufficient to satisfy the Court that she was having
indiscriminate connection for hire which it was necessary to
establish in order to prove that she was a prostitute”. The Court,
relying on R De Munck [1918] 1 K.B.D. 635, accepted the view
that proof of actual sexual connections is not necessary to prove
that a person is a prostitute but that she may be one even if she is
a virgo intacta who “submits her body for the purpose of
general lewdness for gain”. De Munck’s case was also
referred to in the matter of a Reference Re ss.193 and 195.1(1)(c)
of the Criminal Code (Man.), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123 at 1159 where
the Canadian Supreme Court (per Lamer, J.) held that the basic
definition of prostitution is “the exchange of sexual services of
one person in return for payment by another.” Whilst I agree, I
must add that the concept of prostitution always involves elements of
indiscrimination and regularity: A mistress true to and kept by one
lover can hardly be regarded as a prostitute and neither can a person
who received payment for a single indiscretion. And whilst the
traditional view of prostitution focused on the practice that it was
almost invariably women who offered sexual services to men against
payment and that other cross- or same sex prostitution was the
exception, the definition cannot be gender biased. Having considered
these and other authorities in point, it seems to me that a
prostitute is a person who renders sexual services on a regular and
indiscriminate basis to another person for payment.
I must immediately point out that
prostitution per se is not and was never a crime in common
law. In earlier comments on the common law position, Milton and
Cowling, South African Criminal Law and Procedure, vol. III
at 343 wrote:
"The law (and society) adopts an ambivalent attitude to this
oldest of professions. On the one hand prostitution is condemned as a
social evil while on the other hand it is tolerated in so far as it
is not a criminal offence for a woman to be a prostitute nor is it an
offence for a man to have sexual relations with a prostitute."
In S v H, 1988 (3) SA 545 (A)
the prosecution submitted that prostitution was made an offence by s.
20(1)(a) of the Immorality Act, 1957 (RSA) – later renamed the
“Sexual Offences Act”. That section, which reads identical to
section 10(a) of the Act (and to which I shall return later in this
judgment), provides that “any person who knowingly lives wholly or
in part on the earnings of prostitution shall be guilty of an
offence.” After a careful analysis of the section’s predecessors
in the Transvaal (s. 21(1)(a) of Ord. 46 of 1903), Orange Free State
(s. 13(1)(a) of Ord. 11 of 1903), Cape (s. 33(1)(a) of Act 36 of
1902) and Natal (s. 15(1)(a) of Act 31 of 1903) and the legislative
context in which the prohibition appears, Kumleben JA concluded (at
554F) that “on a proper interpretation of s 20(1)(a) it was not
intended that criminal liability should attach to the prostitute
involved…”. The Court’s finding had a quick response in South
Africa: its Parliament criminalised prostitution by the promulgation
of s. 20(1)(aA) of the Sexual Offences Act, 1957. A similar amendment
was not made to the Act in Namibia and the common law position, as
incorporated into our law by Article 66(1) of the Constitution,
remained unaltered: Prostitution per se is not a crime.
It is from that premise that the
applicants launched their main attack on the constitutionality of
section 2(1) of the Act. Mr. Miller, appearing together with Mr.
Mouton on behalf of the applicants, strenuously argues that the
subsection creates an anomaly: Whereas a prostitute is seemingly
allowed in law to ply his/her trade, s. 2(1) prohibits the prostitute
from keeping or using any house or place for that purpose. In so
doing, he submits, the Legislature “takes with the left hand, what
it permitted with the right hand and the prostitute is left in a
situation where she can for practical purposes not carry out her
profession”. Hence, he contends, the essential content of the
constitutional right to “practise any profession, or carry on any
occupation, trade or business” entrenched in Article 21(1)(j) of
the Constitution is negated.
The argument is by no means unique. In
the Reference-case, supra, at 1162 Lamer J refers to
the position in Canada where prostitution is also not illegal but
where “almost everything related to prostitution has been regulated
by the criminal law except the transaction itself”. On that basis
counsel in that case argued that Parliament had made prostitution de
facto illegal even if it had not done so de jure.
Inasmuch as
prostitution is not proscribed by law, it can hardly be contended
that a prostitute’s rights under Article 21(1)(j) have been
directly infringed by section 2(1) of the Act. But even if I were to
accept that the manner in which the Act regulates activities
surrounding prostitution amounts to a de facto prohibition of
the “profession”, I have serious reservations whether it can be
said that the applicants’ rights as contemplated by Article
21(1)(j) are being derogated from. It is, in my view, implied by that
Article that the protected right relates to a profession, trade,
occupation or business that is lawful. The inclusion of that right in
our Constitution must be seen against a shameful history of job
reservation for the privileged few and the exclusion of a large
number of disadvantaged persons from access to certain professions,
occupations, trades and businesses in South West Africa under South
African rule. They are closely associated to the scourge of
discriminatory apartheid laws and racist practices so
expressly condemned in the preamble and other parts of our
Constitution (cf. Articles 23, 40(l) and 63(i)). Those who founded
this country’s constitutional future were determined to eradicate
those practices by providing, amongst others, for equal accessibility
to and a free choice to pursue a career in any profession,
occupation, trade or business. They never contemplated or intended to
create a constitutional right to be or become a professional
pedophile, assassin, kidnapper or drug lord.
I find some support
for this view in the judgments of other courts in this region where
South Africa had a similar and equally notorious history of racial
discrimination and apartheid in the workplace. The historical
similarity is apparent from the judgment in City of Cape Town v AD
Outpost and Others, 2000 (2) SA 733 (C) at 747B-E, where Davis J
quoted with approval the following remarks of Jones J in JR1013
Investments CC and Others v Minister of Safety and Security and
Others, 1997 (7) BCLR 925 (E) 930B-E:
“We have a history of repression in the choice of trade, occupation
or profession. This resulted in disadvantage to a large number of
South Africans in earning their daily bread. In the pre-constitution
era the implementation of the policies of apartheid directly and
indirectly impacted upon the free choice of a trade, occupation or
profession: unequal education, the prevention of free movement of
people throughout the country, restrictions on where and how long
they could reside in particular areas, the practice of making
available structures to develop skills and training in the employment
sphere to selected sections of the population only, and the statutory
reservation of jobs for members of particular races, are examples of
past unfairness which caused hardship. The result was that all
citizens in the country did not have a free choice of trade,
occupation and profession. Section 22 is designed to prevent a
perpetuation of this state of affairs.”
That being the case, judgments dealing with the entrenchment of a
similar freedom in the interim and final Constitutions of the
Republic of South Africa are of some relevance to the interpretation
of Article 21(1)(j). In S v Lawrence; S v Negal; S v Solberg,
1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC) at par [34] Chaskalson P summarised the South
African Constitutional Court’s understanding of that freedom
protected under s. 26 of the Interim Constitution:
“On this approach to the interpretation of s 26 the right to engage
in economic activity and to pursue a livelihood anywhere in the
national territory would entail a right to do so freely with others.
Implicit in this is that the participation should be in accordance
with law. Thus nobody can claim that s 26 gives him or her the right
to deal in stolen property or in harmful drugs or to break the law in
any other way.”
It is against
Namibian law to keep a brothel. Unless the law is unconstitutional
for another reason, it cannot be unconstitutional on account of
Article 21(1)(j) simply because the business of “keeping a brothel”
is not included in the menu of lawful business options available to
the applicants.
But even if I
accept that the manner in which prostitution is regulated and
restricted by the Act de facto diminishes the right protected
under Article 21(1)(j), it is by no means the end of the enquiry. In
terms of Article 21(2) of the Constitution, Parliament has the right
to limit the exercise of that freedom by law “in so far as such law
imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the rights and
freedoms conferred by the said Sub-Article, which are necessary in a
democratic society and are required in the interests of the
sovereignty and integrity of Namibia, national security, public
order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court,
defamation or incitement to an offence.”
Summarising the
Supreme Court’s interpretation and application of Article 21 (2) in
Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs and Others, 1995 NR 175
(SC); 1996 (4) SA 965 (NmS), this Court said in Fantasy
Enterprises CC t/a Hustler The Shop v Minister of Home Affairs and
Another; Nasilowski and Others v Minister of Justice and Others,
1998 NR 97 (HC) at 101H-102D:
“Based on the analysis of Article 21(2) by Dumbhutshena J in the
Kauesa case, I am satisfied that any legislative provision
which derogates from a person’s right to freedom of speech and
expression guaranteed in Article 21(1)(a) will, if challenged in a
competent court, only be allowed to stand: (a) if that law imposes a
reasonable restriction on the exercise of that freedom; (b) if that
restriction is necessary in a democratic society and (c) if that
restriction is required in the interests of the sovereignty and
integrity of Namibia, national security, public order, decency or
morality or required in relation to contempt of court, defamation or
incitement to an offence (Kauesa p. 976B-C). Moreover, the
“clawback” provisions of Article 21(2) are to be restrictively
interpreted “to ensure that the exceptions are not unnecessarily
used to suppress the right to freedom guaranteed in Article 21(1)(a)”
(Kauesa p 981A) and the onus to prove that a legislative
restriction falls squarely within the enabling provisions of Article
21(2) is on the Government which relies on the enforceability of the
provision (Kauesa p 890A). In determining whether the
Government has discharged that onus in any particular case,
the court will be mindful that the law in question has been enacted
by a body of democratically elected representatives of the people and
allow a margin of appreciation in favour of Parliament’s views.
In determining whether a legislative provision passes the
constitutional muster of Article 21(2), the court needs to identify
the legislative objective of the Act; examine the means employed by
the Legislature to achieve that end and satisfy itself that the one
is rationally and reasonably connected to the other by applying the
values and principles of a democratic society.”
That is also the
approach I intend to follow when considering the constitutional
permissibility to prohibit the keeping of brothels.
The legislative
objective of the Act, stated in general terms, is to maintain and
promote public order, decency and morality and to prevent incitement
to an offence. Those are permissible objectives expressly
contemplated in Article 21(2). In so doing, the Legislature not only
prohibited the keeping of brothels, but also the enticement or
procurement of females to a brothel or to become prostitutes (s. 5),
public solicitation (s. 7), the commission of immoral acts in public
(s. 8), the exploitation of prostitutes for gain (s.10) and the
commission of sexual offences with girls under the age of 16 years,
with female idiots or imbeciles and the like (ss. 14 and 15). The
Legislature was clearly concerned both with the social ills at the
core of prostitution and the keeping of brothels and with those on
the periphery, such as child prostitution (especially in the poorer
sections of the community with which this Court had to deal with on a
number of occasions in the recent past), the notorious trafficking in
women, the spread of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases
and the nuisance or embarrassment that members of the public will be
submitted to if brothels are established in their neighbourhoods, if
prostitutes are permitted to publicly display themselves naked or in
a demeaning manner in parlor windows and if they solicit business in
the streets. In the latter regard Dickson CJ, dealing with sections
193 (keeping of bawdy-houses) and 195.1(1)(c) (public solicitation
for purposes of prostitution) of the Criminal Code (Manitoba,
Canada), said in the Reference-case, supra, at 1135 :
“The Criminal Code provision subject to attack in these proceedings
clearly responds to the concerns of home-owners, businesses and
residents of urban neighbourhoods Public solicitation for the
purposes of prostitution is closely associated with street congestion
and noise, oral harassment of non-participants and general
detrimental effects on passers-by or bystanders, especially children.
In my opinion, the eradication of the nuisance-related problems
caused by street solicitation is a pressing and substantial concern.
I find, therefore, that sending the message that street solicitation
for purposes of prostitution is not to be tolerated constitutes a
valid legislative aim.”
It is with the
general objectives of the Act in mind and the specific manner in
which the Legislature went about to address them that I find the
legislative purpose behind section 2(1) of the Act (in proscribing
the keeping of brothels for the purpose of prostitution) as a valid
and pressing one.
Turning to the
reasonableness of the measures employed to achieve that statutory
objective, I again remind myself that prostitution per se is
not an offence. In the latter context I must briefly refer to the
“apparent anomaly” propagated by Mr. Miller in argument. In S
v Jordan and Others, 2002 (1) SA 797 (T) at 801B-I Spoelstra J
dealt with a similar argument:
“If I understand the argument correctly its point of departure and
its conclusion is the same: namely, if prostitution is not criminal
then no activity involving prostitution may constitute an offence.
Once a woman is entitled to sell her body, everyone else is entitled
to engage in services for his or her own gain to facilitate the
prostitute in doing so. Such a submission ignores the fact that the
brothel owner and the brothel employee cannot rely on the same
considerations that are relevant when the rights of the prostitute as
an individual are inquired into. This difference is thoroughly
outlined by the following quotation contained in Ms De Kock's heads
of argument from Prostitution in Europe by Abraham Flexner
(1919) at 94 - 5:
'A man and a woman may be permitted unobtrusively to arrange and
carry out a rendezvous. So far there appears to be no police method
of dealing with them effectively and impartially. But when the
streets are used to carry on negotiations and thereby others are
drawn into the maelstrom; when third parties - be they pimps,
bordello keepers, vendors of liquor and entertainment, or others -
endeavour to develop prostitution for their own profit; when disease
is communicated, not infrequently to innocent persons: in all such
cases a third party is concerned; and a public that was more or less
indifferent as to what took place between two mature individuals has
become increasingly clear as to its interests and duty.'
When prostitution becomes an organised business venture conducted by
persons who profit from the prostitutes' activities, it is no longer
a private affair between a man and a woman (or nowadays between any
two persons), which takes place in private without directly affecting
third parties. When it becomes a business openly carried on in
business or residential areas or the streets or in buildings, the
rights of every other citizen and therefore the community are
affected. The evidence placed before the court in this matter shows
conclusively that the general public regards any form of prostitution
with repugnance and disgust. All such individuals have the right to
be free of the risk of being accosted on a street by a prostitute or
a pimp or of having to tolerate not only the disturbance of their
peace of mind, their ethical or moral serenity, dignity and
tranquility, but also of being exposed to and having to endure all
the byproducts that accompany such business, such as disorderly,
disgraceful or disgusting conduct, drunkenness and drug abuse - to
name but a few.”
I agree with the
differentiation he made. Denying a person the right to keep a
brothel for the purpose of prostitution impacts mainly on the ability
of the brothel-keeper to earn an income from prostitution – in
practice almost invariably from making money by selling sexual
services rendered by prostitutes. It also deprives the prostitute
from earning an income in a brothel. The financial implications that
the prohibition has for brothel-keepers and prostitutes alike are far
removed from the core issues that Article 21(1)(j) is seeking to
protect, i.e. the freedom to choose and pursue a particular
profession, occupation, trade or business. Considering the pressing
and justifiable governmental and legislative concerns relating to
public order, decency and morality, the prejudicial effect of the
prohibition on the earning capacity of prostitutes and
brothel-keepers pales by comparison.
It is for these
reasons that I conclude that inasmuch as section 2(1), read with the
definition of “brothel”, proscribes the keeping of a brothel for
the purpose of prostitution, it constitutes a reasonable restriction
that is necessary in a democratic society and, furthermore, that it
is rationally connected and proportional to the statutory objective
of the Act to promote and maintain public order and standards of
decency an morality.
“…to visit
for the purpose of having unlawful carnal intercourse”
But can the same be
said if a house or place is defined, not by keeping or using it for
the purpose of prostitution, but for persons to visit for the purpose
of having “unlawful carnal intercourse”? The latter phrase is
defined in section 1(vi) of the Act to mean –
“carnal intercourse between persons who are not married or who are
not partners in a customary union in terms of the traditional laws
and customs applied by a particular population group referred to in
section 3 of the Representative Authorities Proclamation, 1980
(Proclamation AG. 8 of 1980).”
It is the incorporation of that phrase in the definition of “brothel”
that constitutes the basis of the applicants’ contention that the
proscription in section 2(1) is overbroad. Mr. Miller submits on
behalf of the applicants that sexual intercourse between persons who
are not partners in a civil or customary union is widely accepted and
tolerated in society. It is unreasonable, he contends, to penalise
those persons for “keeping a brothel” if they use their bedroom
regularly for the purpose of having sexual intercourse with one
another. He argues that it is anomalous for the Legislature to say
that adultery is not an offence but, if you keep a room for you and
your lover to visit regularly for the purpose of having sexual
relations, you may be charged with and convicted of keeping a
brothel.
The Government Attorney, acting on behalf of the respondents in these
proceedings, agrees.
To the extent that carnal intercourse between a prostitute and his or
her customer falls within the definition of “unlawful carnal
intercourse”, the Legislature must have intended to cast the net of
what is regarded as a brothel wider by the inclusion of the phrase
“for persons to visit for the purpose of having unlawful carnal
intercourse” than would have been the case had the definition been
limited to “a place kept or used for prostitution”. By using the
phrase “unlawful carnal intercourse” the Legislature must have
intended for purposes of that definition to refer to carnal
intercourse taking place in circumstances other than in the context
of prostitution. The question that falls to be decided is whether the
inclusion of those other activities within the sweep of the
definition does not render the proscription in section 2(1)
unreasonable and for that reason overly broad and constitutionally
impermissible.
If the meaning of “unlawful carnal intercourse” in the definition
of “brothel” is qualified as I have indicated in the previous
paragraph, the difference between a person having such intercourse
with another and a prostitute selling her services to a customer is
at once apparent. Sexual intercourse of a carnal nature between
persons involved in an exclusive relationship (other than marriage or
a customary union) will, for example fall within the ambit of the
definition. Not only unmarried persons that are living together as
husband and wife but also those that are married to one another
according to religious rites or practices not recognised by law as a
civil marriage or regarded as a customary union (e.g. Muslim
marriages) are brought within the scope of the definition. So too,
are lovers and mistresses, no matter how discreetly they conduct
their relations. There are also other examples.
Including in the definition of “unlawful carnal intercourse” all
such sexual interaction as may take place between persons who are not
partners in a civil or customary union, may well be justified in
respect of the prohibitions contained in the Act regarding unlawful
carnal intercourse with girls under the age of 16 years (section
14(1)(a)); with a female idiot or imbecile in circumstances that do
not otherwise amount to rape (section 15(a)); with a female who has
been stupefied or overpowered for that purpose by the use of certain
substances (section 16) or with a female who is detained against her
will at a house or other place for that very purpose (section
13(1)(a). I must, however, immediately add that, given the
gender-biased and apparent discriminatory manner in which those
sections have been promulgated, I do not wish to be understood to
make any finding about the constitutionality thereof.
Other than those, carnal intercourse between persons not bound to one
another by civil marriage or customary union does not raise the same
moral, social, health and public concerns than those associated with
prostitution. No payment is involved that may entice persons to sell
their bodies, their dignity or sexuality whether it be for reasons of
necessity or avarice. Unlike prostitution, carnal intercourse (as
qualified) normally has a substratum of love or affection and rarely
involves engagement in indiscriminative sexual relations with
numerous strangers.
It is not difficult to imagine a wide range of morally acceptable
activities that may fall foul of section 2(1) of the Act. I shall
illustrate it by reference to only one example. If, bearing the other
definitions in mind, one reads the definition of “brothel” to
include any room or premises used for unmarried persons to visit for
the purpose of carnal intercourse, virtually every hotel, guest house
or other accommodation establishment in Namibia is a brothel for
purposes of the Act and every keeper of those establishments (not to
mention those who are deemed to keep it under section 2(2)) makes
him- or herself guilty of an offence. Whilst I do not agree with Mr.
Miller that a single act of “unlawful carnal intercourse” will
make the place or house a brothel (compare S v M, 1977 (4) SA
886 (A) at 895H: “…where the definition speaks of a house or
place ‘... used for purposes of prostitution...’ … it does not
refer to a house or place where a single act, or a few isolated acts,
of prostitution may have taken place”), I have no doubt that the
type of accommodation establishments mentioned are consistently so
used with full knowledge of their respective managements that their
occupants are not necessarily married and may have carnal intercourse
with one another during their stay. Yet, if one would suggest to them
that they are keeping brothels according to the strict letter of the
law, they will be appalled. Not to mention their guests who will be
horrified to hear that they have taken up residence in a “brothel”!
By the inclusion of the wide concept of “unlawful carnal
intercourse” in the definition of “brothel”, the keeping of
which is punishable under section 2(1), the Legislature went beyond
that which is necessary in a democratic society and required in the
interests of public order, decency or morality. Sweeping as wide as
it does, it in effect prohibits activities that falls beyond the
allowable area of state control and included restrictions not
reasonably required for the realisation of the otherwise legitimate
objectives of the Act. In short, it falls short of the minimum
impairment rule, is not proportional to the interests the Act is
seeking to protect and is, for these reasons overbroad and
unconstitutional.
“…for any other lewd or immoral purpose”
As regards the meaning of the words “for any other lewd or immoral
purpose” in the definition of “brothel”, I do not find them to
be overbroad on account of vagueness. Those words too, are not terms
of art but are commonly used and have frequently been interpreted and
applied by our Courts (Compare e.g. R. v H. and Another, 1959
(4) SA 427 (AD) at 432G; S v P, 1975 (4) SA 68 (T) and S v
D, 1975 (4) SA 835 (T)). Invited by counsel appearing for the
appellants in S v M, 1977 (3) SA 379 (C) to interpret those
words restrictively or eiusdem generis with “prostitution”
and “unlawful carnal intercourse”, the Court (per De Kock
J) declined and reasoned (at 381F-382C):
“It seems to me, however, that to construe the section in such a
way would do violence to the ordinary grammatical meaning of the
words used by the Legislature. It has often been pointed out that the
eiusdem generis rule must be applied with caution. Here the
language used is so wide that to cut down its meaning in the way that
has been suggested can only be justified on the basis that the Court
must read into the phrase ‘or for any other lewd or indecent
purpose’ a word such as ‘similar’, or alternatively, if the
Court is to ignore the use of the word ‘any’ in the section. It
is interesting to see that in England where the only word used in the
relevant statute is ‘prostitution’ the argument in favour of a
limited construction of the word has also not found favour. The
meaning of the word ‘prostitution’ is not limited to sexual
intercourse as such. It has been held that prostitution is proved if
it is shown that a woman offers her body or herself for purposes
amounting to common lewdness in return for payment. (See R. v
Webb, (1963) 3 All E.R. 177 (C.A.).) This case is persuasive
authority for the proposition that, even if the word ‘brothel’ in
our Act had been defined only as a house or place kept or used for
purposes of prostitution, it would not have been necessary for the
State to prove acts of sexual intercourse or some activity akin to
it, in order to obtain a conviction. But our Act goes further than
the English statute by adding to the definition the words ‘or for
any other lewd or indecent purpose’…
If acts of the nature charged before the Court in those cases are
covered by the statute in that they fall under the words ‘any other
lewd or indecent purpose’ it shows that the words in question do
not refer only to acts that are related to or necessarily associated
with carnal intercourse. The Legislature has used wide language and I
do not think that there are circumstances present which would warrant
the Court in giving a restrictive interpretation to the words under
consideration. The appellant, in my view, by staging the performances
revealed by the evidence, kept or used his house for a lewd or
indecent purpose and was rightly convicted of keeping a brothel.”
So applied, massage parlors where pelvic massages had been given and
clubs where stripteases had been performed were all considered to
fall within the definition of “brothel” and those keeping them
have been punished accordingly. Whilst Milton and Cowling, op.
cit., at E3-121 questions whether “other forms of lewdness or
indecency (such as the obscene exhibition of persons or films to
viewers) would serve to render a place a brothel”, I find it
difficult to see on which principle the presentation of an obscene
strip show can be distinguished from the showing of a pornographic
film or, for that matter, the showing of a collection of obscene
pictures, paintings or other objects. Does this mean that every
theatre regularly visited by the public because it screens films with
pornographic scenes and every shop that sells pornographic material
such as sex aids, “girlie” magazines, triple x-rated videos and
the like must be regarded as a “brothel” because it is frequented
by persons with lewd or immoral purposes? On the interpretation given
to those words in S v M, supra, it seems to me that the
answer must be in the affirmative.
Many of those activities are otherwise perfectly lawful or regulated
under other statutes, but these examples again illustrate why, by the
inclusion of those words, the Act imposes a constitutionally
impermissible restriction. The prohibition is formulated in a manner
that allows for application far wider than that necessary to attain
the objectives of the Act.
Given the lack of constitutional restraint when the Act was
promulgated, it is not surprising that the Legislature failed to
tailor the words used in the prohibition with the preciseness
required for them to only address the social evil the statute was
aimed at but that it encroached into areas of conduct that, since
Independence, have been constitutionally protected. Had the words
“lewd or immoral purpose” been qualified by words such as
“involving indecent sexual interaction with another person against
payment”, the result might have been different.
The conclusion of the Court on the constitutional challenge to
section 2(1) read with section 1(i) of the Act is that section 2(1)
is constitutional only to the extent that the definition of “brothel”
can be limited to “any house or place kept or used for purposes of
prostitution”. To the extent that it includes the words “or for
persons to visit for the purpose of having unlawful carnal
intercourse or for any other lewd or immoral purpose”, it is
unconstitutional. For the sake of completeness, I should add that I
have also considered the other grounds on which the constitutionality
of section 2(1) has been attacked (such as the right to freedom of
association, equality or privacy) but do not find that any of those
rights have been detracted from in any unconstitutional manner if the
prohibition is limited to the keeping of a brothel for the purpose of
prostitution.
Severability
I am mindful that the respondents have not argued that section 2(1)
is constitutional to the extent that I have found it to be. Although
the Court will give due consideration and weight to admissions,
uncontested allegations and submissions as to the alleged
unconstitutionality of a particular law, they are not binding in any
way. Whether or not a statute is constitutional is ultimately a
question of law to be determined by the Court. That the Court cannot
abrogate that constitutional responsibility or leave it to the
litigants to agree on, is evident from Article 25(1)(b) of the
Constitution – it only allows for judicial interference “(i)f a
competent Court is of the opinion that such law is unconstitutional”.
This Court may and will only strike down a law to the extent that it
is unconstitutional. Article 25(1) makes it clear that “Parliament
or any subordinate legislative authority shall not make any law
…which abolishes or abridges the fundamental rights and freedoms
conferred … and any law …in contravention thereof shall to the
extent of the contravention be invalid…” (emphasis added). If
the Court holds that any part of a law is unconstitutional, it is
obliged to consider whether that part can be severed from the rest
without changing the statutory scheme that the Legislature had in
mind. The test for severability adopted by the Supreme Court in
Government of the Republic of Namibia and Another v Cultura 2000
and Another, 1994 (1) SA 407 (NmS) at 424F is that laid down in
the case of Johannesburg City Council v Chesterfield House (Pty)
Ltd, 1952 (3) SA 809 (A) at 822C-F:
“(W)here it is possible to separate the good from the bad in a
statute and the good is not dependent on the bad, then that part of
the statute which is good must be given effect to, provided that what
remains carries out the main object of the statute . . . Where,
however, the task of separating the bad from the good is of such
complication that it is impractical to do so, the whole statute must
be declared ultra vires. In such a case it naturally follows that it
is impossible to presume that the legislature intended to pass the
statute in what may prove to be a highly truncated form: this is a
result of applying the rule I have suggested and is in itself not a
test.”
Severance is inappropriate when the remaining “good” part of the
statute is so inextricably bound up with the unconstitutional part
that what remains does not give effect to the statutory scheme - or,
as Kentridge AJ and Langa J more eloquently remarked in Coetzee v
Government of the Republic of South Africa; Matiso and Others v
Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison, and Others, 1995 (4)
SA 631 (CC) at 649A: “Their roots are entangled too tenaciously in
the surrounding soil for a clean extraction to be feasible.”
The position in this case is slightly different to the one that the
Supreme Court dealt with in the Cultura-case: The statute under
consideration in that case was promulgated after Independence,
whereas the Act is part of the body of pre-independence legislation
that survived succession. Dealing with pre-constitutional South
African legislation in the Coetzee-case, Sachs J (par. [75])
qualified the test slightly:
“Severability is an important concept in the context of the
relations between this Court and Parliament; like 'reading down', it
is an instrument of judicial restraint which reduces the danger of
producing an overbroad judicial reaction to overbroad legislation. I
agree with Kriegler J's analysis of the matter, subject to one
methodological qualification I feel worth mentioning. It is the
following: in deciding whether the Legislature would have enacted
what survives on its own, we must take account of the coming into
force of the new Constitution in terms of which we receive our
jurisdiction and pay due regard to the values which it requires us to
promote. We must, accordingly, posit a notional, contemporary
Parliament dealing with the text in issue, paying attention both to
the constitutional context and the moment in the country's history
when the choice about severance is to be made. It is in this context
that we must decide whether the good can be separated from the bad.
In the instant case the excisions which my Colleague proposes would
leave a statutory provision that in my view is linguistically
sustainable, conceptually intact, functionally operational and
economically viable; I agree with them.”
The part of the definition of “brothel” that I have found to be
unconstitutional serves only one purpose: to extend the range of
activities that defines a house or place as a brothel beyond that of
prostitution. They can be severed without in any way affecting the
main legislative concern, i.e. that of keeping a house or place for
the purpose of prostitution. That, so it appears from the
respondents’ affidavits, would also have been the concern of a
post-independence Parliament. If the unconstitutional part of the
definition is excised, the remainder will still be “linguistically
sustainable, conceptually intact (and) functionally operational”.
Section
10(a) of the Act
Section 10(a) of the Act makes it an offence for a person to
knowingly live wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution. I
have pointed out earlier with reference to S v H, supra, that
the section does not prohibit a prostitute to live of the income of
his or her trade. Whilst counsel for the applicants concedes that the
section is aimed at third parties living on the earnings of
prostitution, he contends that the section is unconstitutional
because it conflicts with the applicants’ rights to equality,
privacy, freedom of association and to carry on any trade or
occupation. He also submits that the section is vague and overbroad,
amongst other, because it may be construed to include those persons
that the prostitute is in common law obliged to maintain.
I shall deal with the latter argument first. Considered in its
historical context, the prohibition is intended to target persons who
exploit prostitutes for a living. Referring to a similarly worded
provision in the old Transvaal ordinance (No. 46 of 1903) Wessels J
said in R v Seligman, 1908 TS 390 at 393:
“The section refers to anybody who takes money from a prostitute
for the purpose of furthering prostitution. That, after all, is the
test of the whole question - was the money paid by the prostitute for
the purpose of furthering her trade, and was it received by the
accused for the purpose of aiding and abetting her in her trade and
helping her to carry it on? If he receives money from a prostitute
for that purpose, he must be said to live on the proceeds of
prostitution.”
The focus is therefore on those paid by the prostitute to further his
or her trade. Typical of those are pimps who manage, support, protect
and further prostitutes’ businesses for a share of the earnings and
landlords who knowingly allow the use of their premises for
prostitution against payment (Milton and Cowling, op. cit.,
E3-97). In Shaw v Director of Public Prosecutions, [1961] 2
All ER 446 the House of Lords had to interpret the same expression.
In his opinion Lord Reid referred to the normal meaning of the words
“living on” saying that, in the context, it connotes living
parasitically (at 454B-C). Although the words could have a wider
meaning, one should remember that the statute is a penal one that
must be construed restrictively.
It is the parasitic preying on the sexual services rendered by a
prostitute that characterises the relationship and brings it within
the ambit of the prohibition. It is also this characteristic that
distinguishes it from the natural obligation a parent has to maintain
a child, or for that matter, a person receiving payment for
professional or other services rendered and goods supplied that is
not linked to the support or promotion of the prostitute’s trade,
such as her lawyer or greengrocer.
Hence, the words do not have the wide meaning Mr. Miller contends for
in support of the applicants’ constitutional attack based on
overbreadth. In any event, even if they are ambiguous but
nevertheless capable of interpretation supportive of their
constitutionality, the Court is obliged to favour such interpretation
by reading down the section (See: Chaskalson et al.,
Constitutional Law of South Africa, p9-5 para 9.3 (a)) –
especially in the case of penal laws. It is in the nature of
language, where the same word may have different meanings depending
on syntax and context, that it always leaves scope for
interpretation. The mere fact that a word or sentence does not only
bear one meaning, does not make it impermissibly vague or
constitutionally assailable. I do not find such vagueness or
uncertainty in the provisions of section 10(a).
Except in the case of a prostitute who
both manages (“keeps”) and uses a house or place to prostitute
only herself, there is in principle little difference between the
person “living wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution”
and a person “keeping a brothel for the purpose of prostitution”.
Both are using prostitutes to generate an income for themselves. For
the same reasons that I have found that Article 21(1)(j) of the
Constitution does not afford the brothel-keeper a right to generate
an income in that manner, I also hold that it does not protect a
person living parasitically off a prostitute’s earnings. But even
if such a right is protected under Article 21(1)(j), the limitation
thereof in the manner contemplated by section 10(a) of the Act is
justified for the same reasons that I have earlier mentioned in
relation to section 2(1) of the Act. I need not repeat them.
The other constitutional grounds on
which the applicants are seeking to assail the section are either
without merit or irrelevant. The attack on the constitutionality of
section 10(a) of the Act must therefore fail.
Section
2(2) of the Act
Section 2(2) of the Act lists a number of acts that “are ‘deemed’
to amount to the keeping of a brothel” (per Corbett JA in S v M
and Another, 1977(4) SA 886 (AD) at 896A). It reads:
“(2) The following persons shall for purposes of sub-section (1)
be deemed to keep a brothel, namely-
(a) any person who lives in a brothel unless he proves that he
was ignorant of the character of the house or place;
(b) any person who manages or assists in the management of any
brothel;
(c) any person who knowingly receives all the money or any
share of the money taken in a brothel;
(d) any person who is a tenant or occupier of any house or
place and who knowingly permits it to be kept or used as a brothel;
(e) any person who is the owner of any house or place and who
lets it or allows it to be let or to continue to be let, with a
knowledge that such house or place is to be kept or used or is been
kept or used as a brothel;
(f) any woman found in a brothel who refuses to disclose the
name and identity of the keeper or manager thereof;
(g) any person whose spouse keeps or lives in or manages or
assist in the management of a brothel, unless such person proves that
he or she was ignorant thereof or that he or she lives apart from the
said spouse and did not receive all the money or any share of the
money taken therein.”
As Milton and Cowling, op. cit., at E3-110 concludes with
reference to a number of authorities in point, “(t)he effect of
this section is not to create a presumptive conclusion that a person
mentioned in it has committed the offence of keeping a brothel, but
rather to list the persons who can be dealt with as brothel-keepers”.
If the Prosecution alleges that the accused is a person “deemed to
keep a brothel” (not one “keeping a brothel”), it will have to
charge the accused accordingly with reference to the specific
paragraph of section 2(2) allegedly contravened. It cannot charge the
accused with “keeping a brothel” in contravention of section 2(1)
and then, by proving that the accused acted in the manner
contemplated in one of the paragraphs under section 2(2), secure a
conviction on that charge. The “deeming” provision in section
2(2) does not assist the Prosecution’s case against an accused
charged with a contravention of section 2(1) of the Act.
The applicants are not charged with a contravention of section 2(2)
of the Act. For the reasons I have mentioned , they are therefore not
in jeopardy of a conviction thereunder and that subsection cannot be
construed as a presumptive conclusion that they have contravened
section 2(1) of the Act. That being the case, the locus standi of
the applicants to attack the constitutionality of section 2(2) must
be questioned.
In common law a person who claims relief from a Court in respect of
any matter must, as a general rule, establish that he or she has a
“direct interest in that matter in order to acquire the necessary
locus standi to seek relief” (per Rabie ACJ in the case of
Cabinet of the Transitional Government for the Territory of South
West Africa v Eins, 1988 (3) SA 369 (A) at 388A).
When it comes to constitutional matters, the common law position was
drastically altered in the Republic of South Africa, firstly, by the
promulgation of s 7(4) of the interim Constitution and, later, s. 38
of the final Constitution. This was pointed out in Dawood and
Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v
Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of
Home Affairs and Others, 2000(1) SA 997 (C) at 1028J -
1030B. On account thereof Chaskalson P, dealing with the interim
Constitution in Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and
Others v Powell NO and Others, 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at
para [165], adopted a broad approach to legal standing on such
issues, stating that:
''Whilst it is important that this Court should not be required to
deal with abstract or hypothetical issues, and should devote its
scarce resources to issues that are properly before it, I can see no
good reason for adopting a narrow approach to the issue of standing
in constitutional cases. On the contrary, it is my view that we
should rather adopt a broad approach to standing. This would be
consistent with the mandate given to this Court to uphold the
Constitution and would serve to ensure that constitutional rights
enjoy the full measure of the protection to which they are entitled.
Such an approach would also be consistent in my view with the
provisions of s 7(4) of the Constitution . . .''
(Compare also the judgment of O'Reagan J at paras [229] and [230];
Beukes v Krugersdorp Transitional Local Council and Another,
1996 (3) SA 467 (W); Coetzee v Comitis and Others, 2001 (1) SA
1254 (C) at 1264A-C; Ngxuza and Others v Permanent Secretary,
Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape, and Another, 2001 (2) SA 609
(E) 619A-E)
Whilst I respectfully agree with the general tenor of that approach,
I must immediately point out that our Constitution does not expressly
authorise standing to persons acting as a member of, or in the
interest of, a group or class of persons or acting in the public
interest - as the South African Constitution does. It provides in
Article 25(2) that “(a)ggrieved persons who claim that a
fundamental right or freedom guaranteed by this Constitution has been
infringed or threatened shall be entitled to approach a competent
Court to enforce or protect such a right or freedom…”.
It is not necessary for purposes of this judgment to grapple with the
question whether class actions or public interest suits may be
brought to determine the constitutionality of legislation or
governmental actions. Suffice it to say that the applicants did not
seek to bring the application on that basis. Moreover, no case has
been made out in their founding papers that any of their rights or
freedoms has either been infringed or threatened by the provisions of
section 2(2) of the Act. It is clear that they are not being charged
with a contravention under any of the paragraphs of that subsection
or that that they are in jeopardy of being deemed to be
brothel-keepers thereunder. They do not say in their affidavits that
they have or intend to perform any of the acts referred to in section
2(2)(a)-(g) of the Act. Hence, the determination of the
constitutionality of those provisions will, as far as they are
concerned, only be of academic interest. No case has been made out
that the provisions affects any of their rights or freedoms nor are
there any facts apparent from the papers on account of which it can
be said that they may be regarded as “aggrieved” by the existence
of those provisions on the statute book.
Whether in a constitutional or common law context, the person seeking
relief from the Court, bears the burden to prove his or her standing
(See Gross and Others v Pentz, 1996 (4) SA 617 (A) at 632D
“The general rule is 'that it is for the party instituting
proceedings to allege and prove (my emphasis) that he has locus
standi, the onus of establishing that issue rests upon the applicant.
It is an onus in the true sense; the overall onus. . .'. (Mars
Incorporated v Candy World (Pty) Ltd, 1991 (1) SA 567 (A)
at 575H-I)”). The applicants have failed to do that in so far as
they challenge the constitutionality of section 2(2) of the Act.
Section 10(b) of the Act.
Section 10(b) of the Act makes it an offence to “in public or in
private in any way assist… in bringing about, or receive… any
consideration for, the commission by any person of any immoral act
with another person”. Mr. Miller concedes that the applicants are
not charged with a contravention of this section and are not in
danger of being convicted of a contravention thereof. With that
concession in mind, the Court raised with him the applicants’
standing to take issue with the constitutionality thereof. He
immediately conceded that the applicants have failed to establish
such locus standi and referred the Court to the Supreme
Court’s endorsement of the approach to constitutional issues
adopted by Bhagwati J (as he then was) in M M Pathak v Union
(1978) 3 SCR 334: “It is the settled practice of this Court to
decide no more than what is absolutely necessary for the decision of
a case.”
Section
2(3) of the Act
The same cannot be said for the presumptions in section 2(3) of the
Act. The subsection contains presumptive conclusions that “reverse”
the onus of proof in relation to the presumed facts once the State
has proven the other threshold facts for the presumption to become
operative. The section provides as follows:
“(3) When in any prosecution in terms of this Act it is proved-
(a) that any house or place is kept or used as a brothel and
that, having regard to the locality and accommodation thereof, the
rent to be paid or paid or being paid for the house or place
concerned is exorbitant, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is
proved, that the accused knew that the house or place concerned was
kept or used as a brothel;
(b) that a notice in writing has been given to the accused by
a police officer of or above the rank of sergeant or by two
householders living in the vicinity of the house or place concerned,
that the house or place concerned is kept or used as brothel, it
shall be deemed that the accused knew that the house or place
concerned was kept or used as a brothel.”
Mens rea being one of the elements of the offence created by
section 2(1) (see. Milton and Cowling, op. cit. at E3-108),
the purpose of section 2(3) is presumably to assist the State in
discharging the burden of proof it bears. These presumptions, Mr.
Miller contends, diminishes the applicants’ right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty according to law as guaranteed by
Article 12(1)(d) of the Constitution.
The right to be presumed innocent lies at the very heart of our
criminal justice system. Its objective is to protect the innocent and
to ensure that it is only those proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt
that will be punished. In R v Oakes, (1986) 26 DLR
(4th) 200 the Canadian Supreme Court (per Dickson CJC) examined the
reasons underlying the presumption and said at 212-213:
“The presumption of innocence protects the fundamental liberty and
human dignity of any and every person accused by the State of
criminal conduct. An individual charged with a criminal offence
faces grave social and personal consequences, including potential
loss of physical liberty, subjection to social stigma and ostracism
from the community, as well as other social, psychological and
economic harms. In light of the gravity of these consequences, the
presumption of innocence is crucial. It ensures that until the State
proves an accused's guilt beyond all reasonable doubt, he or she is
innocent. This is essential in a society committed to fairness and
social justice.”
The presumption, so Dickson CJC held at p. 214 of the same judgment,
contains three fundamental components: (a) the onus of proof
lies with the prosecution; (b) the standard of proof is beyond
reasonable doubt; and (c) the method of proof must accord with
fairness. A reverse onus provision detracts from the right to
the benefit of that presumption to the extent that it relieves the
prosecution from proving one or more of the elements of the offence.
As Madala, Sachs and Yacoob JJ pointed out in S v Manamela and
Another (Director-General of Justice intervening), 2000 (3) SA 1
(CC) at para [25] “…reverse onuses of this kind impose a full
legal burden of proof on the accused. Accordingly, if after hearing
all the evidence, the court is of two minds as to where the truth
lies, the constitutional presumption of innocence is replaced by a
statutory presumption of guilt.” The result is that such a
provision allows for a conviction even if the Court entertains a
reasonable doubt as to the accused’s guilt.
This Court held in Freiremar SA v Prosecutor General of Namibia
and Another, 1996 NR 18 at 25E, that a reverse onus provision may
be justified in circumstances where “an explanation would be
required because of the presumption raised by the proved facts and
because of the personal knowledge of the accused” (at 26B-C). The
test thus far applied by this Court is whether there is a rational
connection between the proved fact and the presumed fact and whether
the presumed fact is one that is rationally open to the accused to
prove or disprove (See also: Namibian National Students'
Organisation and Others v Speaker of the National Assembly for South
West Africa and Others, 1990 (1) SA 617 (SWA), S v Titus,
1991 NR 318 (HC) and the Freiremar –case, supra).
The first steps this Court took after Independence to examine and
define criteria for the constitutional assessment of reverse
onus-provisions were mainly based on Canadian and, to a lesser
extent, US authorities. I am not altogether convinced that, in
adopting that approach, the Court was mindful of the differences
between our Constitution and the Canadian Charter of Rights. One of
the most fundamental differences is that the presumption of innocence
protected under section 11(d) of the Charter is, like all the other
fundamental rights protected therein, subject reasonable restrictions
“prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society” (see: section 1 of the Charter), whereas our
Constitution does not expressly allow for a limitation of the right
to be presumed innocent.
The majority of the Canadian Supreme Court (per Cory J)
considered the constitutionality of statutory presumptions in R v
Downey, (1992)2 SCR 10. After distinguishing between (a)
permissive presumptions, (b) presumptions that merely cast an
evidentiary burden on the accused and (c) reverse onus provisions
that cast a legal burden on the accused and analysing a number of
authorities in point (Dubois v. The Queen,
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 350; Schuldt v. The Queen, [1985] 2 S.C.R.
592; R. v. Oakes, supra; R. v. Vaillancourt, [1987] 2
S.C.R. 636; R. v. Whyte, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 3; R. v.
Kowlyk, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 59 and R. v. Keegstra, [1990]
3 S.C.R. 697), he extracted seven principles (at 29):
“I - The presumption of innocence is infringed whenever the
accused is liable to be convicted despite the existence of a
reasonable doubt.
II - If by the provisions of a statutory presumption, an
accused is required to establish, that is to say to prove or
disprove, on a balance of probabilities either an element of an
offence or an excuse, then it contravenes s. 11(d). Such
a provision would permit a conviction in spite of a reasonable doubt.
III - Even if a rational connection exists between the
established fact and the fact to be presumed, this would be
insufficient to make valid a presumption requiring the accused to
disprove an element of the offence.
IV - Legislation which substitutes proof of one element for
proof of an essential element will not infringe the presumption of
innocence if as a result of the proof of the substituted element, it
would be unreasonable for the trier of fact not to be satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of the other element. To
put it another way, the statutory presumption will be valid if the
proof of the substituted fact leads inexorably to the proof of the
other. However, the statutory presumption will infringe s. 11(d)
if it requires the trier of fact to convict in spite of a reasonable
doubt.
V - A permissive assumption from which a trier of fact may but
not must draw an inference of guilt will not infringe s. 11(d).
VI - A provision that might have been intended to play a minor
role in providing relief from conviction will nonetheless contravene
the Charter if the provision (such as the truth of a
statement) must be established by the accused (see Keegstra,
supra).
VII - It must of course be remembered that statutory
presumptions which infringe s. 11(d) may still be
justified pursuant to s. 1 of the Charter. (As for
example in Keegstra, supra.)”
The rational connection-test which this Court seemingly adopted is
based on an application of the criteria of reasonableness and
proportionality in assessing the justifiability of a limitation
contemplated in Article 1 of the Charter (c.f. R v Oakes, supra
at 681 and R v Downley, supra at 41. Those are criteria
applicable to the limitation of Article 21-freedoms but not to the
right to a fair trial entrenched in Article 12. I must caution
judicial restraint before entrenched fundamental rights are eroded by
the application of criteria set for the limitation of the Article 21
protected freedoms. The right to a fair trial is, as is the case with
the right to human dignity entrenched in Article 8, not subject to
statutory limitation. Dealing with the rights protected under Article
8, the Supreme Court said in Ex Parte Attorney-General, Namibia:
In Re Corporal Punishment by Organs of State, 1991 (3) SA 76
(NmS) at 86D-E:
‘Although the Namibian Constitution expressly directs itself to
permissible derogations from the fundamental rights and freedoms
entrenched in chap 3 of the Constitution, no derogation from the
rights entrenched by art 8 is permitted. This is clear from art 24(3)
of the Constitution. The State's obligation is absolute and
unqualified. All that is therefore required to establish a violation
of art 8 is a finding that the particular statute or practice
authorised or regulated by a State organ falls within one or other of
the seven permutations of art 8(2)(b) set out above; 'no questions of
justification can ever arise' (Sieghart The International Law of
Human Rights at 161 para 14.3.3).”
Given these fundamental differences, it may be prudent to revisit the
earlier criteria laid down by this Court to justify reverse onus
provisions. It is, however, not necessary to do so for purposes
of this case because, even if I were to accept in favour of the
respondents that the presumption of innocence may be limited by
rational, reasonable and fair reverse onus provisions, I am
nonetheless satisfied that the presumptions created by sections 2(3)
and 12 cannot survive the rational connection-test.
Does proof that a house is used as a brothel and an exorbitant rent
is being paid for it rationally tend to prove that the accused knew
that the house was used as a brothel – as section 2(3)(a) of the
Act presumes? I think not. The section does not require knowledge on
the part of the accused that an exorbitant rent is being or has been
paid for the presumption to become operative. If the accused does not
have such knowledge, there is no rational connection between the
payment of an exorbitant rent and presumed knowledge on the part of
the accused that the place is being used or kept as a brothel.
The presumption of that the accused knew a place is being kept or
used as a brothel created by in section 2(3)(b) of the Act can be
approached similarly. A mere notice to the accused that a place is
being used as a brothel cannot without more justify a rational
inference that the accused knew that that is indeed the case. The
section does not require the person(s) giving such notice to state
reasons for the allegation. In the absence of such reasons, the
recipient is at a distinct disadvantage to consider or investigate
the veracity of the allegation. If, for instance, unbeknown to an
hotel’s manager, a prostitute has taken up temporary residence and
discreetly render her services in one of a hundred hotel rooms, on
what rational basis can it be presumed that the manager knowingly
kept a brothel just because he or she had received a notice?
For these reasons, I find that the statutory presumptions created by
section 2(3) of the Act constitute an impermissible derogation of an
accused person’s right to be presumed innocent as guaranteed by
Article 12(1)(d) of the Constitution.
Section 12
of the Act
Section 12 of the Act creates three presumptions:
“(1) When in any prosecution in terms of this Act the question
arises whether any carnal intercourse between a male and a female was
unlawful, such intercourse shall be presumed, until the contrary is
proved, to have been unlawful carnal intercourse.
(2) When in any prosecution in terms of this Act a person is proved
to live in a brothel or to live with or to be habitually in the
company of a prostitute and has no visible means of subsistence, it
shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that such person
lives wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution.
(3) When in any prosecution in terms of section 6 it is proved that
the accused has performed any act or has done anything or has
furnished any information, which was calculated or likely to enable
any male to communicate with or to establish the whereabouts of or to
trace any female in respect of whom the accused had reason to suspect
to be a prostitute, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is
proved, that the accused have performed such act or have done such
thing or have furnished such information as the case may be, with
intent to enable such male to have unlawful carnal intercourse with
such female.
The applicants are not charged with a contravention of section 6 of
the Act and, insofar as the presumption created by section 12(3) only
applies in the case of such a prosecution, it will not have any
bearing on the applicant’s prosecution. The applicants, therefore,
do not have locus standi to challenge the constitutionality of
section 12(3) of the Act.
In view of the findings I have made regarding the constitutionality
of the phrase “or for persons to visit for the purpose of having
unlawful carnal intercourse” in the definition of “brothel”,
the issue concerning the constitutionality of the presumption in
section 12(1) of the Act has become a moot one. The presumption does
not otherwise bear on the applicants’ prosecution. In the
eventuality that another Court in this jurisdiction may find that
this Court erred in its conclusion in respect of the definition of
“brothel”, it may be of relevance to record that there is in my
view no rational justification for the presumption that all carnal
intercourse between a male an female person, whenever that may arise
as an issue in a prosecution under the Act, has been unlawful. It is
a “presumption without basic facts”: a factual conclusion that is
being drawn without the need for the State to prove any basic facts
that rationally allows for an inference of the presumed fact. The
effect of the presumption is that the accused will have to prove that
it was lawful for him or her to have carnal intercourse with the
other person by reason of marriage or customary union with such
person. Irrational, unreasonable and unfair as the presumption is,
its unconstitutionality is apparent.
In terms of section 12(2) a person who has no visible means of
substance and who is living in a brothel or with a prostitute or is
habitually in the company of a prostitute is deemed to be living
wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution. Given the
difficulty to get prostitutes to testify about the identity of and
arrangements they may have with their pimps, the manifest purpose of
the presumption is to assist in the successful prosecution of those
who, like parasites, are living of the earnings of prostitutes - such
as pimps and brothel-keepers.
The constitutionality of a similar presumption (albeit a factual and
not a legal one) in section 195(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code was
the subject matter of the Canadian Supreme Court’s judgment in R
v Downey, supra. All the judges concurred that the
presumption violated the right to be presumed innocent in section
11(d) of the Charter but the Court was divided on whether or not the
violation was nevertheless a permissible restriction under section 1
of the Charter. It eventually held (with a 3 to 4 majority) that it
was justified. But, as McLachlin J pointed out in a dissenting
judgment (at 41-42), the majority judgment focused on the external
rationality of the presumption, i.e. the rationality of its
connection to the legislative purpose behind its enactment. Of more
relevance to the position in Namibia is his opinion on the question
of internal rationality, in the sense there must be a rational
connection between the substituted fact and the presumed fact. The
latter requires that proof of the substituted fact must make it
likely that the presumed fact is true.
He held the view that it cannot be said that it is likely that one
who lives with or is habitually in the company of a prostitute is
parasitically living on the avails of prostitution. Although it may
be true in some instances, spouses, lovers, children, parents or
room-mates may live with or be habitually in the company of a
prostitute, which is not a criminal offence, without living on the
avails of prostitution. Concluding that a presumption which has the
potential to catch such a wide variety of innocent people in its wake
is arbitrary, unfair and based on irrational considerations, he found
that is was unconstitutional. I agree.
Conclusion
In summary, I find section 1(i) of the
Act unconstitutional in so far as it includes the words “…or for
persons to visit for the purpose of having unlawful carnal
intercourse or for any other lewd or immoral purpose” in the
definition of “brothel”, but that those words can be severed from
the rest of the definition. I also find that the presumptions in
sections 2(3) and 12(1) and (2) of the Act constitute an
impermissible derogation of the applicant’s right to be presumed
innocent. I do not consider section 2(1) - read with section 1(i) in
a more truncated form, i.e. after excision of the impermissible part
– or section 10(a) unconstitutional on any of the grounds advanced
by the applicants. Lastly, I hold the view that the applicants failed
to show that they had the required standing to challenge the
constitutionality of sections 2(2), 10(b) and 12(3) of the Act.
In the premises, the Court’s conclusions do not preclude
continuation of the applicant’s prosecution on the charges brought
under sections 2(1) and 10(a) of the Act and I must decline to grant
a final interdict against such prosecution. The items seized by the
police may be required as exhibits in the prosecution and I must,
therefore, also refuse the prayer for the immediate return thereof.
The parties are agreed that it will not be appropriate to make an
adverse cost order in the case.
In the result, the following order is made:
Section 1(i) of the Combating of Immoral Practices Act, 1980, is
declared unconstitutional only to the extent that the words “…or
for persons to visit for the purpose of having unlawful carnal
intercourse or for any other lewd or immoral purpose” appear
therein as part of the extended definition of “brothel” and the
inclusion of those words are unconstitutional, void and of no effect
and are therefore struck from the definition.
Sections 2(3) and 12(1) and (2) of the Combating of Immoral
Practices Act, 1980 are declared unconstitutional and of no force or
effect.
The application, insofar as it relates to the alleged
unconstitutionality of sections 2(1), 2(2), 10 and 12(3) of the
Combating of Immoral Practices Act, 1980; for a stay of prosecution
and for the return of the seized articles and money, is dismissed.
Each party shall bear his/her/its own costs of suit.
MARITZ, J.
I agree.
__________________
TEEK, JP.
ON BEHALF OF THE APPLICANT:
Instructed by:
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ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT:
Instructed by:
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