S v Kashamane (CA 42 of 2005) [2006] NAHC 40 (14 August 2006);
APPELLANT
RESPONDENT
CORAM:
PARKER, A J
Heard on:
2006 July 26
Delivered on:
2006 August 14
This is an appeal from a decision of the Oshakati magistrate’s court, which convicted the appellant of the offence of assault with intend to cause grievous bodily harm. After evidence was led, the learned magistrate convicted the appellant, and sentenced him to three years imprisonment of which one year was suspended for three years on condition that the appellant was not convicted of a charge of assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm committed during the period of the suspension.
In his notice of appeal filed with the Oshakati magistrate’s court on 9 November 2004, the appellant sought to appeal against sentence only. In response thereto, the learned magistrate filed the following day his reasons for the sentence. Almost one year later, i.e. on 19 September 2005, the appellant, through his instructed counsel, filed amended notice of appeal in which he directed the appeal against both conviction and sentence. The learned magistrate did not file any reasons for the conviction. In a letter dated 4 October 2005, he informed the Registrar that he did not “have any additional reasons to adduce in this matter.” I think it was wrong for the learned magistrate to have assumed that the reasons for the conviction could also stand for the reasons for the sentence because conviction and sentence are two different aspects of our criminal justice system. Be that as it may, as I will show shortly, there was sufficient evidence on the record to support the conviction.
Counsel for the State, Mr. Sibeya, had filed the respondent’s main heads of argument, which were directed to the first notice of appeal. He subsequently filed supplementary heads of argument in response to the amended notice of appeal. The appellant’s counsel, Ms. Kishi, also filed heads of argument.
At the commencement of the hearing Mr. Sibeya sought to argue a point in limine to the effect that the appeal was not ripe for a hearing because the learned magistrate had not, in terms of the rules of the Magistrates’ Courts, given reasons for his decision concerning conviction in line with the amended notice of motion. Mr. Sibeya, however, abandoned the preliminary legal objection when I informed him that the learned Magistrate had in October 2005 informed the Registrar in writing that he did not have any more reasons to give, as mentioned above. His preliminary objection concerning the appellant’s counsel’s failure to file heads of argument timeously had been overtaken by events since the appeal was not heard in September 2005, as scheduled. Therefore, counsel did not pursue this objection, too.
I turn now to deal with the merits of the appeal; first, in respect of conviction. The appellant has raised three grounds of appeal in this regard, namely, that the learned magistrate (1) erred in law by refusing appellant the opportunity to call a witness, (2) erred in law by admitting into evidence inadmissible evidence, and (3) erred in law and/or on the facts by rejecting the appellant’s version and accepting that of the complainant.
The gravamen of Ms Kishi’s argument in respect of the first ground is that the presiding magistrate had a duty to assist the appellant, who was not represented by counsel, to enjoy a fair trial. In this connection, she submitted, the learned magistrate’s failure to call a witness for the appellant constituted a fatal irregularity, which should lead to quashing of the proceedings. Mr. Sibeya argued contrariwise: he submitted that not every irregularity committed by a presiding officer was fatal, leading to setting aside of the proceedings. What mattered, he argued, was the nature of the irregularity and its effect on the proceedings as a whole.
In terms of s. 179 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1977 (CPA), the State must assist an accused, who is unable for financial reasons to secure the attendance of any witness, in securing the attendance of such witness, so long as the evidence of such witness is necessary and material to the accused’s defence. In Gert Kisting v The State, I observed that the CPA provision has found powerful expression in the fair trial provisions under art. 12 (1) (d) and (e) of the Namibian Constitution. I am of the opinion that the touchstone of the applicability of s. 179 (3) of the CPA is the intertwined requirements of necessity and materiality. Thus, in practical terms, the judicial officer ought to investigate the situation and surrounding circumstances to determine whether the evidence of such witness is necessary and material for the accused’s defence. On this point, I cannot do better than to repeat what I said in Gert Kisting v The State, supra, where I referred to propositions of the law by this Court and South African Courts:
From the record, it is clear to me that the learned magistrate did not just refuse to permit the appellant to call his witness without first investigating the circumstances to determine whether the evidence of the witness was necessary and material for the appellant’s defence. The following critical and apropos dialogue between the learned magistrate and the appellant appear on the record:
Accused person is there anything in reply from what the Prosecutor has cross-examined? Is there anything to clarify? --- Yes.
Having applied the principles underlying the authorities referred to above, I am satisfied that the learned magistrate carried out the correct investigation, as he was expected to do in the circumstances, and made certain that the appellant’s witness could possibly not give any relevant evidence pertinent to the matter. As Mr Sibeya submitted, the witness was not present when the appellant stabbed the complainant, and whether or not the witness gave the vehicle to the appellant to keep would not on any ground possibly assist the appellant in his defence. That being the case, I conclude that the appellant forfeited his right to call the witness because he failed to make any plausible showing as to how the testimony of the witness would have been both material and favourable to his defence. I, therefore, find that the learned magistrate did not err in law or on the facts when he denied the appellant’s request to call the witness.
The appellant’s second ground of appeal is that the learned magistrate erred in law by admitting inadmissible evidence. This relates to the way the medical report was admitted into evidence. Ms Kishi submitted that an irregularity was committed when the medical report (on Form J88) was handed in and accepted as an exhibit in a manner that was not in conformity with s. 212 (4) and (12) of the CPA.
I respectfully accept Ms Kishi’s submission as well founded, but only to the extent that for the certificate (on Form J88) to have been admitted as part of the prosecution’s evidence in terms of s. 212 (4) and (12), in the circumstances, it was not only desirable but also proper for the maker of the certificate to have been either subpoenaed to give oral evidence or to have been requested to reply to written interrogatories respecting the contents of Form J88. Nevertheless, her submission to the effect that the contents of a certificate and those of an affidavit under s. 212 (4) should be substantially the same, is, with respect groundless.
A certificate is issued in lieu of an affidavit, and the provisions of para. (a) of s. 212 (4) regarding the contents of such affidavit only apply mutatis mutandis with reference to such certificate. For this reason, in my view, the contents of Form J88 and an affidavit need not be the same; they should only be substantially and reasonably the same. I, therefore, find that the contents of Form J88 in casu satisfy the requirements of s. 212 (4) of the CPA, apart from my finding above that the admission of From J88 constituted an irregularity. However, as I shall demonstrate shortly, I do not think a failure of justice resulted from such irregularity within the meaning of s. 309 (3) of the CPA so as to lead to the quashing of the conviction.
In this connection, I respectfully accept Mr. Sibeya’s argument that even in the absence of the medical report (Form J88) there was ample and credible evidence aliunde the Form J88 upon which the learned magistrate could find the following. The appellant stabbed the complainant at the right side of his back with a kitchen knife without any provocation from the complainant. The stabbing took place in the yard of the house of the owner of a motor vehicle that is away from the bottle store, where earlier on the complainant and the appellant had had some altercation as to which of the two the owner of the said vehicle had left the vehicle with.