COURT OF NAMIBIA MAIN DIVISION, WINDHOEK
no: LC 122/2014
04 MARCH 2016
the matter between:
citation: Roads Contractor Company v
Mughandira N.O (LC 122/2014) 
NALCMD 7 (04 March 2016)
04 September 2015
04 March 2016
Application to review and set aside an
award in terms of s 89(4) and 89(5) of the Labour Act 11 of 2007 –
Grounds for review – set out in s 89(4) ands 89(5) –
Labour law – Grounds for review – gross irregularity and
an award obtained improperly – application dismissed.
The applicant brought a review
application in terms of s 89(4) and s 89(5) of the Labour Act 11 of
2007, seeking an order from the Court to review an award issued in
favour of the third respondent alleging gross irregularity on the
side of the arbitrator and the award obtained improperly –
Court found no irregularities in the procedure followed during the
arbitration and no evidence causing the award to be obtained
improperly – Application dismissed with no costs order.
The application is dismissed.
The request for a cost order by the third respondent is refused.
There is no order as to costs made.
This is a review application in terms of s 89(4) and s 89(5) of the
Labour Act (the Act) by the
applicant against the first to third respondents seeking the relief
set out in the notice of motion dated 15 August 2014.
In the application, the applicant has prayed for an order in the
PLEASE TO TAKE NOTICE THAT:, That Roads Contractor Company
(hereinafter referred to as the applicant) will make an application
to this Court for the award and orders set out below to be reviewed
and pray for an order in the following terms:
Reviewing and setting aside the arbitration award granted by the 1st
Respondent against the applicant in case no. CRWK 389-14 which award
was delivered on 16 July 2014.
Reviewing and setting aside the order of the 1st
respondent that ordered that the amount of N$38 107.52 must be paid
by the applicant to the 3rd
respondent on or before the 25th
day of July 2014.
Reviewing and setting aside the order of the 1st
respondent that ordered that the applicant must furnish the 3rd
respondent with a duly completed pension withdrawal form on or before
close of business on the 25th
day of July 2014.
Granting the applicant further and or alternative relief.’
The notice of motion does include grounds for the review but they are
set out in the founding affidavit of Mr Engelhard Haihambo who
disposed to such an affidavit on behalf of the applicant. They are:
1st respondent committed gross irregularity in conducting
second conciliation in the absence of the applicant after a first
conciliation of 20 June 2014 resolved the dispute for which
certificate was issued.
The second ground is that the 1st respondent committed
gross irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings by recording in
the award that the applicant was and not represented by a legal
practitioner and that it has nowhere been recorded on the award that
the applicant applied for representation, and also for allowing one
party to a dispute legal representation but refuse same to the other.
The third ground is that the 1st respondent committed a
gross irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings by finding that
the deduction of N$66 480.35 the applicant claimed from the terminal
benefits of the third respondent violated the provisions of s 12 of
The fourth ground is that the 1st respondent committed a
gross irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings and or that the
third respondent obtained the award improperly.
The background facts common to the parties are that the applicant and
the third respondent entered into a contract of employment or about
13 June 2012 when the third respondent was employed by the applicant
as an internal auditor at its head quarters in Windhoek: employment
agreement so concluded contained express and implied terms which
terms were to be complied with by both parties. The agreement was
also subject to the terms and conditions of the policy of the
On the date of employment, the third respondent was given two options
to choose one from either to lease a vehicle through FML scheme or to
accept a car allowance. The third respondent chose the first option,
namely to lease a vehicle through the scheme.
However, the vehicle was returned to the owners on 3 February 2014
after he stopped working for the applicant on 13 January 2014. He
tendered his resignation on 13 December 2013. The return of the
vehicle was acknowledged by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the
applicant on 19 February 2014 by written correspondence in accordance
with the terms of the agreement between the applicant and Eqstra.
The third respondent was informed among others that he was liable in
the amount of N$66 480.61 in respect of excess charges together with
an amount of N$7 386.74 in advance payment payable to the applicant
before the end of the lease agreement.
In the correspondence exchanged between the applicant and the third
respondent, it appears that the applicant owed the third respondent
some money in the form of terminal benefits. The applicant though and
after numerous requests by the third respondent self and by his legal
practitioners, refused to pay him his terminal benefits.
Because of the refusal to pay the third respondent his terminal
benefits, the third respondent on 30 April 2014 referred a dispute
for the non-payment of terminal benefits against the applicant,
indicating that the cause of action arose on 13 January 2014, the
date he stopped working for the applicant.
All the necessary papers were served on the applicant and Loemore
Mughandira was designated by the Labour Commissioner to conciliate
and arbitrate the dispute. After the conciliation failed, the dispute
was set down on 20 June 2014 at 10h00 for arbitration by Mr Lovemore
Mughandira at the Labour Commissioner’s Office in Khomasdal.
On June 2014 the hearing was postponed to 4 July 2014 at 09h00 for
hearing before the same arbitrator. Kelina Mudzanapabwe, representing
the third respondent, Mr Ihuhua, (the third respondent) and Mr Bazil
Strauss on behalf of the applicant were in attendance on the 20 June
The same people were again present on 4 July 2014 when the hearing
resumed. Mr Strauss applied for a postponement of the hearing from
the bar but was refused after Ms Mudzanapabwe counsel for the third
respondent objected to a further postponement. Mr Strauss was
thereafter excused and the hearing proceeded in the absence of the
The arbitrator, upon consideration of the evidence of the third
respondent, who is the only person testifying in the hearing and his
evidence not challenged by the applicant through cross-examination,
made an award in favour of the third respondent on 16 July 2014.
Hereunder is the verbatim reproduction of the award:
made the findings as stated herein above, I now order as follows:
That the Respondent (Roads Contractor Company Limited) must pay the
applicant (Godfrey Ihuhua) an amount of N$56 672.90 as terminal
benefits less the applicant’s study loan in the amount of N$8
066.64. A further deduction of N$3 112.00 in respect of transport
overpayment be effected. A further deduction of N$7 386.74 in respect
of an authorized one month deduction be effected. The total amount to
be paid by the Respondent to the Applicant is N$38 107.52 inclusive
of payments due by the applicant to the Receiver of Revenue if
The said amount of N$38 107.52 must be paid by the Respondent to the
Applicant on or before the 25th
day of July 2014.
The Respondent must furnish the Applicant with a duly completed
pension withdrawal form on or before close of business on the 25th
day of July 2014.
No order as to costs.
on the 16th
day of July 2014 at Windhoek.’
grounds for review in detail
first ground: The first respondent committed gross irregularity in
the conduct of the proceedings
The applicant submits it did not receive a notice informing it of the
first and or subsequent conciliation meetings. The applicant asserts
that, it did not participate in any conciliation meeting that
resulted in the dispute referred to the second respondent by the
third respondent being successfully resolved and consequently, the
applicant denies that it was a party to any such alleged settlement
agreement as alleged in the said certificate. On this basis,
the applicant submits that on the effect of the terms of the
certificate, it was irregular for the first respondent to proceed and
conduct arbitration proceedings if the parties had already resolved
the dispute at the conciliation stage. The applicant further submits
that the arbitration proceedings be reviewed and the award be set
aside on the basis that, the terms of the certificate purports that,
the applicant participated in the alleged conciliation meeting and
became a party to a settlement agreement that resolved the dispute
when in fact and in truth, the applicant never participated in either
the alleged conciliation meeting and or the alleged settlement
The third respondent in his answering affidavit submits that at the
time of the hearing and at all material times thereafter it was the
understanding that what the arbitrator issued was a certificate of
unresolved dispute, same which would have enabled the arbitrator to
proceed to arbitration in terms of Rule 27(2)(b)
and 27(3) of Rules Relating to the Conduct of Conciliation and
Arbitration before the Labour Commissioner (‘the Con/Arb
Rules’) as he thereafter did.
The third respondent submits that the arbitrator completed the
certificate of resolved dispute in error for the following reasons:
The dispute was not resolved as the parties had not been able to go
through the process of conciliation due to the nonappearance of the
applicant at the conciliation/arbitration proceedings. Furthermore,
the third respondent submits that the certificate issued by the
arbitrator is of no consequence and should be disregarded due to the
mere fact that the matter proceeded to arbitration on 4 July 2014 and
an arbitration award was thereafter issued on 16 July 2014. The
arbitrator could not have intended to issue a certificate of resolved
dispute after having proceeded to arbitration. An arbitrator
conducting conciliation proceedings after having been designated in
terms of s 85(5) as the arbitrator herein was, is not entitled to
issue a certificate such as the one referred to by the applicant.
The third respondent denies applicant’s averments. In
amplification of such denial the third respondent submits that from
the outset the applicant’s representative Mr. Kauta was aware
of the set down dates and the applicant’s averment that it was
unaware of the conciliation meeting is untrue. He referred the Court
to paragraph 2 of the arbitration award wherein the arbitrator states
that at the first meeting of 20 June 2014 he took steps and confirmed
with the administration section of the office of the Labour
Commissioner that the Notice of Conciliation Meeting of Arbitration
hearing was served on the applicant, and he obtained a confirmation
of the fax transmission. He further telephonically contacted the
offices of the applicant and one Ms Eva Geingob indicated that the
set down, although received, was not effectively brought to her
attention, and she therefore requested for new dates.
It was on this basis of such request that the arbitrator proceeded to
issue new dates, same being 4 July 2014, and he confirmed that the
applicant had received the fax transmission setting out the new set
down dates. In light of these actions of the arbitrator the third
respondent submits that the applicant cannot aver to have been
unaware of both the dates on which the matter was set down.
Furthermore, on 4 July 2014 Mr Strauss from the applicant’s
legal practitioners appeared at the office of the labour commissioner
to postpone the matter on behalf of Mr Kauta who had apparently
fallen ill and therefore unable to attend to the matter. The
applicant thus knew the date of hearing.
The third respondent denies that the terms of the certificate have no
factual basis and they are not factually correct. In any event, the
applicant uses this aspect to cover up their own ineptitude and do
not care attitude portrayed before the hearing.
ground: The first respondent committed gross irregularity in the
conduct of the proceedings.
The applicant submits in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the award, that, the
third respondent was represented by a firm of Legal Practitioners. At
paragraphs 3 and 5 of the award, the first respondent records that,
the applicant was not on record as having legal representation. The
applicant points out that, there is nowhere in the arbitration award
where it is reflected that the third respondent applied for legal
representation in the arbitration proceedings and also there is
nowhere in the award where it is reflected that the first respondent
authorised the appearance of the third respondent’s legal
practitioners in those proceedings. The applicant submits that the
conduct of the arbitrator was improper and contrary to the terms of
article 10(1) of the Namibian constitution for the first respondent
to allow a Legal Practitioner to represent one party to the dispute
and refuse same to the other party. On this basis the arbitrator
committed a gross irregular in the manner in which he conducted the
arbitration proceedings and the said proceedings should be reviewed
and set aside.
The arbitrator is correct in his assertion that the applicant was not
on record as having legal representation as there was no request for
representation filed on behalf of the applicant in this matter. Mr
Strauss who represented the applicant and applied for a postponement
could not point out such a request to the arbitrator. The third
respondent alleges that despite there being nowhere in the
arbitration award where it is reflected that he applied to have legal
representation in this matter, he submits that he did apply for the
same and a copy of his request for representation was duly received
by the office of the labour commissioner and was in the record of
arbitration proceedings which is attached to his answering affidavit.
It is not the arbitrator who did not allow a legal practitioner to
represent one party to the dispute and allowed same to the other
party, as the applicant is alleging. It is clear from the arbitration
award paragraph 6 that following the arbitrator’s refusal to
postpone the matter, Mr Strauss requested that he be excused as he
did not have instructions to attend to the matter. Mr Strauss did
also not ask for the hearing to be adjourned for him to get
instruction from either Mr Kauta or the applicant self on what to do
next. He merely requested to be excused from the proceedings and
left. Nothing prohibited the arbitrator to conduct the arbitration
hearing in the absence of the applicant.
ground: The first respondent committed a gross irregularity in
the conduct of the proceedings.
At paragraph 14 of the award, the first respondent made a finding to
the effect that the deduction of money the third respondent claimed
for the terminal benefits violated the provisions of s 12 of the
Labour Act, and relied on this finding to grant the award in the
favour of the third respondent. Applicant submits that this finding
is not supported by law. Furthermore, applicant submits that the
first respondent makes a finding that, the amounts of N$3 112.00 and
N$7 386.74 constitute permissible and lawful deductions in terms of
the provisions of s 12 of the Labour Act. The applicant submits that
this finding is not at all supported by the provisions of s 12.
Applicant submits further that it is evident from the conditions set
out in s 12(3) of the Act that, there is no category that supports
the allowance of the deduction of overpayment and a monthly
installment that the first respondent found to be permissible under
the provisions of s12.
Save for admitting the applicant’s submission with regard the
evidence that was placed before the arbitrator during the arbitration
proceedings, the rest were denied by the third respondent and
challenged the applicant to prove the allegations. On the allegation
of permissible lawful deductions, the third respondent denies the
contents thereof and submits that the arbitrator does indeed point
out the basis on which he found that the deductions of N$3 112.00 and
N$7 386.74 constituted permissible deductions for the reasons: that
arbitrator does not at any part of the award hold that the deductions
of the two amounts were lawful for purposes of section 12 of the
Labour Act, but rather that he found them lawful in that the third
respondent allowed the applicant to deduct same from his salary as he
indeed owed it to the applicant.
The third respondent further submits that the unlawfulness of the
deductions of the two amounts was never challenged and was therefore
never in question. The third respondent submits that he did not owe
such amount and the applicant did not prove his liability for same.
As indicated above in a review proceedings the applicant has to
attack the method of the trial not the result thereof. It is the
lawfulness of the trial, how the trial was conducted not the merit of
such a trial. Therefore, in my view, the finding made by the
arbitrator that the deductions of terminal benefits violated s 12 of
the Act whether wrong or right is a question of interpretation of the
facts and law placed before him during the trial. Therefore, not
reviewable, but appealable.
Miller AJ in Purity
Manganese (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner Mwafufya-Shikongo & Others
in para 15 of his judgment said the following:
application seeking to review and setting aside those findings faces
a stiffer and higher hurdle than it would be in an appeal. The
applicant on review must establish, not only that the finding of fact
is arguably wrong. The error in the factual finding must be of such a
nature that no reasonable trier of fact would have come to a similar
ground: The first respondent committed a gross irregularity in the
conduct of the proceedings and or the third respondent obtained the
At paragraph 14 of the award, the first respondent makes a finding to
the effect that the deduction by the applicant of the amount of N$66
480. 35 payable to Eqstra Fleet Management and or Omatemba fleet
services violates the provisions of s 12 of the Labour Act. The
provisions of s 12(1)(a)
clearly states that, if a deduction is required or permitted in terms
of any law, then such a deduction is permissible. Applicant submits
that, it relied on the legal principle of set off to claim the
deduction of the amounts that third respondent owed the applicant.
On this basis since set-off is a principle recognized in law, it
falls within the scope and meaning of the concept “any law”
prescribed in s 12(1)(a)
of the Labour Act. Applicant submits that this finding is incorrect
and is not supported by any law. Applicant submits that the third
respondent obtained the award improperly as he was bound by the
principle of set-off and on that basis, he was not entitled to the
arbitration award and the award must be reviewed and set aside solely
on this ground.
On the other hand the third respondent submits that the deductions of
the amount of N$66 480. 35 was not a deduction permitted in terms of
law. The legal principle of set-off would only apply where it is a
fact that a party owes an amount to another party, which fact he
denies, and which fact the applicant had the onus to prove during the
hearing of dispute at the office of Labour Commissioner.
Once again I should reiterate what I said already that the applicant
did not present any evidence in the arbitration proceedings –
nor cross-examined the third respondent after he had testified.
Tribunal is a forum established for the purpose of resolving
disputes operating under the
auspices of the Labour Commissioner with jurisdiction to hear and
determine any dispute or any other matter arising from the
interpretation, implementation or application of this Act and makes
any order that the tribunal is empowered to make in terms of any
provisions of this Act. The evidence of the third respondent tendered
in the arbitration proceedings was unchallenged. Therefore, the
arbitrator had no choice but to accept the evidence.
The applicant self is to blame for being absent from the proceedings
on 4 July 2014. Mr Strauss attended but requested to be excused after
his request for a postponement was turned down.
The applicant has alleged as one of his ground for review that the
arbitrator issued a certificate to the effect that the matter was
resolved between the litigants – therefore committed an
The question arises as why was this aspect not raised with the
arbitrator earlier before set down of the hearing on 20 June 2014.
Similarly, Mr Strauss was quiet about it on 4 July 2014. Why?
In any event, even if the so-called certificate of resolve, was
issued in error, it cannot now be used by the applicant to ask this
Court to set aside the award. The applicant took part in the
proceedings after the certificate was issued therefore ratified and
condoned any defect the certificate might have had.
Had the arbitrator granted a postponement on 4 July 2014, the
probability is high that nothing would have been said by the
applicant about the certificate.
Maritz JA in the Ondjiva
case reminds that litigation is a serious matter and, once having put
a hand to the plough, the applicant should made arrangement to see it
through. The principle applicable in Ondjiva
case is applicable to the applicant in this matter.
Section 89(4) and (5) the Act make provision for the review and
setting aside of an arbitration award issued in terms of s 86 and
reads as follows:
A party to a dispute who alleges a defect in the arbitration
proceedings, in terms of this part, may apply to the Labour Court for
an order reviewing and setting aside of the award:
within 30 days after the award was served on the party unless the
defect involves corruption, or
If the alleged defect involves corruption, within six weeks after the
date that the applicant discovers the corruption;
a defect in subsection (4) means
that the arbitrator:
committed misconduct in relation to the duties of an arbitrator,
committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration
proceedings; or exceeded the arbitrator’s powers or
that the award have been improperly obtained.’
As pointed out already hereinbefore, reliance on the certificate of
resolve of the dispute will not assist the applicant for reasons
stated above. I accepts the third respondent’s version that the
first respondent made a bona fide
error by, instead issuing a certificate of unresolved dispute, a
certificate of resolved dispute was issued. I am not even surprised
that Mr Khama, counsel for the applicant did not bother to address
the Court on the certificate issue during the hearing. I take it
counsel regarded the aspect not to have tainted the lawfulness and
fairness of the arbitration proceedings.
That being the case, ground one of review is devoid of any substance
and stands to be dismissed.
Ground two should suffer the same fate like ground one. In the
discussion and evaluation of the evidence presented before him, the
third respondent explained in detail and gave reasons for the finding
that the applicant did not submit a request for legal representation
to the Office of the Labour Commissioner. He could not find any prove
on the file of such a request from the applicant. The applicant had
also not attach a copy of such a request to the founding affidavit
filed in support of this application if the applicant submitted one.
On that basis I reject the allegation that the applicant was denied
his right to equality before the law and freedom from discrimination
provided for in Article 10 of the Constitution. Mr Khama also did not
support the contention during the oral submissions.
The applicant makes an allegation in the third ground for review that
the finding by the first respondent that the deduction of money the
third respondent claimed for the terminal benefits violated the
provisions of s 12 of the Labour Act and relied on this finding to
grant the award in favour of the third respondent, is a gross
irregularity. This is so because the finding is not supported by law,
I should point out at this stage that the applicant failed to set out
his ground of review clearly and specifically in the notice of motion
as required in applications for appeals. The defect of committing a
gross irregularity in the conduct of the proceedings is provided for
in s 89(5) (ii). The subsection talks of ‘in the conduct of the
proceedings’ – meaning the irregularity must have been
committed in the method, the way or through a procedure followed in
the proceedings. To attack the finding of the arbitrator which was
made against the law – (in the instant matter) against s 12 of
the Act, is not a ground for review. It is an attack against the
result of the proceedings (See Ellen Louw case).
In the Ellen Louw
matter, Hoff AJ said that if the reason to have the judgment set
aside is that the court came to a wrong conclusion on the facts or
the law, the appropriate procedure is by way of appeal. Where
however, the grievance is against the method of the trial, it is
proper to bring the case on review.
In the present matter, in ground three, the applicant is not
complaining against the method of the trial but against the wrong
conclusion on the law. This ground must also fail.
While on this ground, I wish to mention that Mr Khama spent much of
the time to argue the point. He started off by submitting that the
first respondent (the arbitrator) was the proper person to answer to
the allegations in the founding affidavit of the applicant not the
third respondent. He submitted that the first respondent did make the
findings in the award which are sought to be reviewed and set aside.
Further, it is the contention of Mr Khama that the application before
Court was to review an administrative decision. I agree. The
arbitrator is an administrative official performing a public function
in terms of the Labour Act. The same applies to the Office of the
Labour Commissioner in its capacity as an administrative body.
However, the essence of Mr Khama, if I understood him correctly, is
that by failing to oppose and defend or justify his award, the first
respondent rendered the application unopposed by default. That the
third respondent was not competent to oppose and defend the
application because he did not issue the award.
Meanwhile, Ms Mudzanapabwe differed and submitted that although the
third respondent cannot justify what the first respondent has
decided, but has an audience to be heard in the similar fashion the
applicant has a right to bring the application. In addition, Ms
Mudzanapabwe argued that according to the policies of the applicant,
her client, the third respondent was liable for excess alone per the
vehicle benefit scheme policies. This, according to her will happen
when the vehicle was driven over 150 km and the owner is unable to
prove that the kilometres were for business purpose.
Ms Mudzanapabwe denied on behalf of her client that the client was
liable to pay the money the applicant is asking from the third
respondent .The amount the first respondent stated in his award that
it was deducted in violation of s 10 of the Act.
In addition, Ms Mudzanapabwe argued that the agreement signed between
applicant and the service provider, her client was not a party to it
and that the client was not aware of the clause the applicant is now
relying on for the payment.
In my opinion Ms Mudzanapabwe is correct in view of the fact that the
applicant did not lead evidence in the arbitration proceedings to
prove that the third respondent was aware of the clause in the
agreement between the applicant and the service provider. Therefore,
I accept the version of the third respondent that it is possible that
he was only aware of the excess charges which he would pay in case he
had driven the vehicle over 150 km and cannot prove that the
kilometres were for official purposes.
With regard the concern of Mr Khama why the first respondent, the
decision-maker did not come to Court to explain and justify his
award, can be dispose of quickly and in short. The first respondent
did not only issue the award without giving reasons justifying his
findings – he wrote a detailed judgment wherein he assessed and
evaluated the evidence placed before him. Therefore, the applicant
was served with a written and signed award with concise reasons which
the applicant is now appealing against. That said, it is therefore
not necessary for the first respondent to oppose and defend a review
or an appeal application.
In the present review application, the third respondent has a right
to oppose the application and defend the award issued in his favour.
If he had failed to do so, this Court would have had no alternative
but to grant the application on an unopposed basis. Therefore, and
for reasons stated above, in particular that the applicant did not
prove in the arbitration proceedings that the third respondent was
aware of the clause in the agreement signed between the applicant and
the service provider making him liable to pay any outstanding amount
on the vehicle, I reject the argument of Mr Khama on the principle of
set off because the third respondent, did not owe the applicant any
money apart from the money he said should be deducted from his
terminal benefits, which the first respondent deducted from the
terminal benefits in the award. As said above, I could not find
anything untoward in the award which could have vitiated the finding
made on the liability or not of the money due and payable to either
the applicant or the service provider by the third respondent. That
bring me to the last ground for review, namely the award was
As said hereinbefore, s 89(5)(b)
has nothing to do with the conduct of the arbitration but of the
litigant – in this case, the third respondent. Mr Khama did not
argue to bolster the ground during oral submissions. He had also not
indicated to the Court that the applicant no longer pursuing or has
abandoned the ground. Be that it may. I have not been told what is
that what the third respondent did which led him to obtain the award
He referred a dispute for unpaid terminal benefits to the Labour
Commissioner and obtained an award for terminal benefits. The ground
is also without merits.
In conclusion, I considered the request by counsel for the third
respondent to be granted a costs order. According to her the
application was frivolous. I disagree. Not in this application. The
applicant acted within his right to bring the application. The
request for costs will not be granted.
Accordingly and for the reasons stated above, the following order is
The application is dismissed.
The request for a cost order by the third respondent is refused.
There is no order as to costs made.
E P UNENGU
APPLICANT : D
by Dr Weder, Kauta & Hoveka Inc., Windhoek
RESPONDENT: K Mudzanapabwe
by Köpplinger Boltman, Windhoek
Parker: Labour Law in Namibia: UNAM PRESS p 211.
NLLP 2013 (7) 211 LCN 15 June 2012.
85(1) and (2) of the Act.
Construction CC and Others v HAW Retailers t/a Ark Trading 2010 (1)
NR 286 (SC).
Louw v Chairperson, District Labour Court and J P Snyman &
Partners (Namibia) (Pty) Ltd: Case No. LCA 27/1998 p11.